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THE QUESTION RAISED BY LAWRENCE: 
MARRIAGE, THE SUPREME COURT AND 
A WRITTEN CONSTITUTION 
BY RICHARD G. WILKINS† AND JOHN NIELSEN†† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Lawrence v. Texas,1 the Supreme Court concluded that state legisla-
tures could not criminalize homosexual sodomy.2  Many (including Justice 
Scalia in dissent) noted that Lawrence raises a serious question regarding 
the future of marriage: Can marriage still be defined as the union of a man 
and a woman?3  But Lawrence also raises another sober question: Does 
America still have a written Constitution?4  The answers are unknown. 
As a result, and depending upon who is speaking, the President and the 
Senate are either preserving, ignoring, rewriting, or destroying the Constitu-
tion each time an individual is nominated or confirmed to the federal 
bench.5  Because of decisions like Lawrence, the selection of federal 
judges, particularly Supreme Court Justices, has become one of the nation’s 
 
 †Professor of Law and Managing Director, The World Family Policy Center, J. Reuben Clark 
Law School, Brigham Young University.  An earlier version of this article was prepared as written 
testimony delivered before a hearing of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, October 20, 2005, 
Washington, D.C.  A shorter version was delivered orally at the hearing, and this article expands 
upon the version printed in the Congressional Record.   
 ††J.D., J. Reuben Clark Law School.  Mr. Nielsen provided able research and editorial assis-
tance and is properly credited as co-author.  The legal analysis and views expressed herein, 
however, are those of Professor Wilkins.  
1. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
2. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558. 
3. Id. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
4. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., OVERCOMING THE CONSTITUTION: IMPLEMENTING THE 
CONSTITUTION passim (Harvard Univ. Press 2001); see also Saikrishna B. Prakash, Overcoming 
the Constitution: Implementing the Constitution, 91 GEO. L.J. 407, 407 (2003) (book review) 
(“The constitutional law that emerges from [Supreme Court] opinions sometimes bears only the 
slightest resemblance to the Constitution itself.”). 
5. The recent, politically based arguments made during the nomination and confirmation of 
Chief Justice John Roberts demonstrates that members of the Senate—as well as the President and 
the American people—rather firmly believe that the “text” of the Constitution depends, in large 
measure, upon the personal views of the individuals who sit on the Nation’s highest court.  See, 
e.g., Bill Adair, Roberts is Chief; Now Who’s Next?, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 30, 2005, at 
1A (stating that Bush calls John Roberts a “faithful guardian of the Constitution”); David Jackson, 
A New Era Begins as Roberts Takes Oath Top Justice OK’d Despite Democrat Holdouts; Pivotal 
Issues Await, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 30, 2005, at 1A (indicating Senator Kennedy fears 
that Roberts will reverse the progress of equal protection gained over the last few decades). 
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most contentious political issues.6  James Madison and Alexander Hamil-
ton, among others, assured the Founding Generation that federal judges 
would merely exercise “[j]udgment,” not “[w]ill.”7  Time and experience, 
however, have not borne out their reassurance that the federal judiciary 
would be the least dangerous branch.8  Instead, the writings of such anti-
Federalist essayists as Brutus, who was highly critical of the potentially 
unlimited power of the Article III courts to override state and federal legis-
latures,9 provide a rather more accurate description of modern constitutional 
law.  “[I]t is impossible . . . to say” what “the principles are, which the 
courts will adopt,” except that they “may, and probably will, be very liberal 
ones” not confined to the “letter” of the Constitution.10 
The Constitution was adopted by a Founding Generation which as-
sumed, along with Madison and Hamilton, that while the document would 
be subject to amendment and interpretation, the amendment process was 
vested where it belonged—in the hands of “the People”11—with the inter-
pretative process safely left to judges who would apply, but not create, the 
 
6. Even the process of judging has become politicized.  In determining the meaning of the 
Constitution, individual Justices frankly admit they consider possible political reactions to their 
individual votes.  For example, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion), the Supreme Court reaffirmed Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973), not because Roe was correctly decided, but because three Justices concluded that their 
departure from the “central holding” of Roe might appear “political” and therefore undermine the 
Court’s “legitimacy.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 869.  The Casey Court reasoned that a “decision to 
overrule Roe’s essential holding under the existing circumstances would address error, if error 
there was, at the cost of both profound and unnecessary damage to the Court’s legitimacy.”  Id. 
7. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago. 
edu/founders/documents/a3_1s11.html. 
8. Id. 
9. 4 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 236-37 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).  
Brutus, in this installment, argues that judicial power over the legislative branches will tend to 
expand leading (eventually) to the legislature accepting the Court’s (possibly) erroneous views 
regarding legislative powers: 
It is to be observed, that the supreme court has the power, in the last resort, to deter-
mine all questions that may arise in the course of legal discussion, on the meaning and 
construction of the constitution.  This power they will hold under the constitution, and 
independent of the legislature.  
The latter can no more deprive the former of this right, than either of them, or both of 
them together, can take from the president, with the advice of the senate, the power of 
making treaties, or appointing ambassadors.  In determining these questions, the court 
must and will assume certain principles, from which they will reason, in forming their 
decisions.  These principles, whatever they may be, when they become fixed, by a 
course of decisions, will be adopted by the legislature, and will be the rule by which 
they will explain their own powers. 
Id. 
10. Id. at 236. 
11. No one—and certainly not the authors of this article—seriously contends that the 
constitutional principles established in 1789 are immune from change.  The Founders did not bind 
future generations to a rigid and unchanging document.  On the contrary, they established specific 
mechanisms for amending the document.  See U.S. CONST. art. V. 
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law.12  These assumptions are seriously out-of-place in a world where law-
yers, law professors, politicians and even Supreme Court Justices are fixed 
upon the purported virtues of “a living Constitution.”13  The Constitution is 
now so alive that its meaning changes with each new appointment to the 
federal bench.14 
How did America’s fundamental political charter become so vaporous 
that the Nation’s entire political structure trembles each time a new Justice 
is named to the Supreme Court?15  The genealogy of Lawrence tells the 
tale. 
 
12. The Anti-Federalists warned that the power of the judiciary would be “formidable, some-
what arbitrary and despotic” and would become “more severe and arbitrary, if not tempered and 
carefully guarded by the constitution, and by laws, from time to time.” Observations Leading to a 
Fair Examination of the System of Government Proposed by the Late Convention, Letters From 
the Federal Farmer (1787 and 1788), in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 214, 315-16 
(Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).  Alexander Hamilton responded by assuring that the judges would 
exercise “judgment” rather than “will.”  THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 7. 
13. As early as 1976 Justice Rehnquist expressed his concerns regarding the notion of a 
“living Constitution:” 
At least three serious difficulties flaw the brief writer’s version of the living 
Constitution.  First, it misconceives the nature of the Constitution, which was designed 
to enable the popularly elected branches of government, not the judicial branch, to 
keep the country abreast of the times.  Second, the brief writer’s version ignores the 
Supreme Court’s disastrous experiences when in the past it embraced contemporary, 
fashionable notions of what a living Constitution should contain.  Third, however 
socially desirable the goals sought to be advanced by the brief writer’s version, 
advancing them through a freewheeling, non-elected judiciary is quite unacceptable in 
a democratic society. 
William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 699 (1976).  But 
see Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 730-33 (2005). 
14. The current Constitution is so malleable that one can legitimately question whether it fur-
thers such important values as stability and certainty.  As Justice Scalia noted in the opening para-
graphs of his dissent in Lawrence: 
“Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.”  That was the Court’s senten-
tious response, barely more than a decade ago, to those seeking to overrule Roe v. 
Wade.  The Court’s response today, to those who have engaged in a 17-year crusade to 
overrule Bowers v. Hardwick, is very different.  The need for stability and certainty 
presents no barrier. 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).  The 
normative content of “living” constitutional law—in particular the right to privacy at issue in 
Lawrence—can expand, erode, accrete or metastasize (depending upon whether one wants to 
describe the change in positive or negative terms) within a few decades.  Compare Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (erecting the constitutional right to privacy upon the 
“sacred” union of a man and a woman in marriage) with Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (finding that 
privacy is not based upon marriage; rather the right rests upon an individual entitlement to deter-
mine one’s “own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human 
life”). 
15. See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITU-
TIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (Oxford Univ. Press 2004); Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. 
Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism? The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and 
Judicial Review, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1594, 1594 (2005) (book review) (explaining that the 
Justices of the Supreme Court have become “the ultimate and final expositor of constitutional 
meaning”). 
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II. JUDGING IN THE SHADOWS 
Lawrence relies upon a constitutional right not set out in the actual 
language of the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment—the increas-
ingly ubiquitous modern “right of privacy.”16  This right was announced in 
Griswold v. Connecticut,17 a 1965 United States Supreme Court decision.  
The case involved the State of Connecticut’s legislative decision to regulate 
the use of condoms by married couples—a law that, in the mid-1960s, was 
quaint and anachronistic.18 
But rather than wait for the ordinary processes of democratic debate to 
adjust state policy, the Supreme Court assumed the task of freeing the elec-
torate of Connecticut (and America in general) from a law the dissenting 
Justices called “silly.”19  The Court emancipated the country from the bonds 
of silliness by noting that the Connecticut law regulated the marital relation-
ship, a union between a man and a woman, that was—in the words of the 
Court—“intimate to the degree of being sacred.”20  This sacred relationship, 
the Court concluded, must be supported by a “right to privacy,” even 
though the Constitution nowhere mentions the right.21 
The Court did not consider whether its new analysis was consistent 
with the long-standing history and traditions of the American people.  It 
could not undertake such an analysis because any careful review of actual 
historical practices would have shown that—however out-of-touch 
Connecticut’s law appeared in the middle of the 1960s sexual revolution—
states throughout the nation had regulated the sexual conduct of married 
and unmarried citizens by means of adultery, incest, and fornication laws 
from the dawn of the Republic.  The policies animating these laws (as noted 
by the concurring opinion in Griswold) may have seemed less “silly” in 
1965 than a prohibition on condom usage,22 but adultery, incest, and 
 
16. See generally Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564.  “Privacy” has become one of the key concerns 
when potential Supreme Court nominees are considered, as evidenced during the John Roberts 
confirmation process.  See I Come Before the Committee With No Agenda. I Have No Platform, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2005, at A28 (providing the opening statement at the confirmation hearing 
of Justice Roberts, followed by a statement by Senators Arlen Specter and Dianne Feinstein 
announcing their specific intent to address privacy rights at the outset of the meetings). 
17. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
18. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480. 
19. Id. at 527 (Stewart & Black, JJ., dissenting). 
20. Id. at 486 (majority opinion). 
21. Id. 
22. See, e.g., Jeremy D. Weinstein, Note, Adultery, Law, and the State: A History, 38 
HASTINGS L.J. 195, passim (1986) (giving a history of the adultery statutes beginning with 
“barbarian times”); Jennifer A. Herold, Note, A Breach of Vows but Not Criminal: Does Lawrence 
v. Texas Invalidate Utah’s Statute Criminalizing Adultery?, 7 J.L. FAM. STUD. 253, 253-58 (2005) 
(referencing the punishment enforced by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for adultery—
death by hanging—and also discussing the history of the Utah adultery statute); Note, 
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fornication laws are rather difficult to distinguish on constitutional grounds 
from Connecticut’s regulation of marital fecundity.23  As the dissenting 
Justices pointed out, nothing in the text of the Constitution invalidated 
Connecticut’s law simply because it was “unreasonable” or “unwise.”24 
The Court was required to fashion a new analysis that would set aside 
the state’s condom policy because neither the words of the Constitution nor 
the specific history and traditions of the American people invalidated 
Connecticut’s law.25  Accordingly, the Court announced that the “specific 
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras” (or partial shadows) that 
give the actual wording of the Constitution “life and substance.”26 
 
Constitutional Barriers to Civil and Criminal Restrictions on Pre- and Extramarital Sex, 104 
HARV. L. REV. 1660, 1661 (1991) (stating that in 1991 more than twenty-five percent of the states 
still had fornication statutes). 
23. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 498 (Warren, C.J., Goldberg, & Brennan, JJ., concurring).  The 
concurring opinion noted that Connecticut’s policy was essentially a “birth-control law” because 
“of the admitted widespread availability to all persons in the State of Connecticut, unmarried as 
well as married, of birth-control devices for the prevention of disease, as distinguished from the 
prevention of conception.”  Id.  The concurring Justices, however, ignored the fact that state 
condom-use policies which encourage child bearing by married couples, like state adultery laws 
which encourage sexual fidelity by married couples, both express political and moral judgments 
regarding the social value and utility of certain sexual practices within marriage; political and 
moral judgments that are distinguishable from each other only as a matter of degree.  Which 
regulation, a rule prohibiting a married couple’s use of condoms or a rule prohibiting any expres-
sion of extra-marital sexuality, intrudes more significantly on the sexual rights of the marital 
partners?  This inquiry could be answered in various ways by various analysts.  Nevertheless, 
while the concurring Justices found Connecticut’s interest in prohibiting one method of birth 
control unconstitutional, they had no difficulty whatsoever in announcing that the constitutionality 
of adultery statutes were “beyond doubt.”  Id. 
24. Id. at 520-21 (Black & Stewart, JJ., dissenting).  As Justice Black’s extensive dissent, 
joined by Justice Stewart, emphasized: 
[T]here is no provision of the Constitution which either expressly or impliedly vests 
power in this Court to sit as a supervisory agency over acts of duly constituted legis-
lative bodies and set aside their laws because of the Court’s belief that the legislative 
policies adopted are unreasonable, unwise, arbitrary, capricious or irrational.  The 
adoption of such a loose, flexible, uncontrolled standard for holding laws unconstitu-
tional, if ever it is finally achieved, will amount to a great unconstitutional shift of 
power to the courts which I believe and am constrained to say will be bad for the 
courts and worse for the country.  Subjecting federal and state laws to such an unre-
strained and unrestrainable judicial control as to the wisdom of legislative enactments 
would, I fear, jeopardize the separation of governmental powers that the Framers set 
up and at the same time threaten to take away much of the power of States to govern 
themselves which the Constitution plainly intended them to have. 
Id. 
25. While the result in Griswold is rarely criticized, the legal soundness of the Griswold 
analysis has been questioned.  See, e.g., Michael A. Woronoff, Note, Public Employees or Private 
Citizens: The Off-Duty Sexual Activities of Police Officers and the Constitutional Right of 
Privacy, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 195, 198-201 (1984) (noting that even though the outcome of 
a case may be correct under Griswold, the logic of the case “remains unconvincing”). 
26. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484: 
[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations 
from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 
U.S. 497, 516-522 (dissenting opinion).  Various guarantees create zones of privacy. 
       
1398 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 83:1393 
In real life, the substance of shadows (and particularly partial shadows) 
is questionable and they result from the lack, not the presence, of light.  
Nevertheless, relying upon dimness, the sacred nature of marriage and the 
talismanic word privacy, the Court walked away from the specific guaran-
tees of the United States Constitution, as well as the history, experience, 
and traditions of the American people.27  The judicial journey begun in 
Griswold has now brought into constitutional doubt the “sacred” union of 
“marriage” upon which Griswold itself rests.28  As a result, Americans must 
act not only to protect the union lauded in Griswold, but to reinstate what 
Chief Justice John Marshall in 1803 called “the greatest improvement on 
political institutions” achieved in America: the establishment of “a written 
constitution.”29 
Legal scholars applauded the rather startling analysis of Griswold.  
They wrote elaborate justifications for the use of “privacy analysis” to abol-
ish legislative anachronisms with a minimum of fuss and bother.30  They 
paid little heed to Justice Black’s warning that Griswold had dramatically 
altered the meaning of the Bill of Rights by “substitut[ing] for the crucial 
 
The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as 
we have seen.  The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of 
soldiers “in any house” in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another 
facet of that privacy.  The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the “right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.”  The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables 
the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to 
surrender to his detriment.  The Ninth Amendment provides: “The enumeration in the 
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others 
retained by the people.” 
Id.  A penumbra is defined as: “1. A partial shadow, as in an eclipse, between regions of complete 
shadow and complete illumination.”  Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q= 
penumbra (last visited May 9, 2007). 
27. See Woronoff, supra note 25, at 198-201. 
28. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 (“Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, 
hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred.”). 
29. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803). 
30. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 740-52 (1989) 
(setting forth the “genealogy” of “privacy” and praising Griswold as providing the foundation for 
constitutional recognition of “personhood”).  For an elaborate, book-length defense of Griswold 
and related cases, see BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 88, 140-59 (Belknap 
Press 1991) (praising Griswold as an outstanding example of what he calls a “multigenerational 
synthesis” of new “constitutional moments” with “preexisting constitutional values”).  Even 
generally “conservative” legal scholars—who candidly note the frailty of its constitutional 
analysis—generally tend to support the outcome of Griswold.  See, e.g., Jane E. Larson, The New 
Home Economics, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 443, 449 n.20 (1993) (reviewing RICHARD G. POSNER, 
SEX AND REASON (1993)) (noting that although Posner concludes that “Griswold and its 
successors probably have no legal-doctrinal ground in the Constitution,” he nevertheless agrees 
with the outcome of Griswold and many subsequent cases on the ground that certain regulations of 
sexual conduct are “so offensive, oppressive, [and] probably undemocratic” as to warrant a 
finding of constitutional invalidity). 
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word or words” of various constitutional guarantees “another word”—
privacy—that could be “more or less flexible and more or less restricted in 
meaning” than the Constitution’s original text.31  They similarly ignored the 
grave potential that Griswold’s broad notion of a “living Constitution” 
could threaten the very existence of the “written Constitution” lauded by 
John Marshall.32 
In the rush to support the purportedly enlightened approach of 
Griswold, too many Americans, including citizens, lobbyists, lawyers, law 
professors and judges, seemed to forget that constitutional law involves 
much more than ensuring proper results in particular (even silly) cases.  
Those who drafted the document viewed the Constitution’s distribution of 
decision making power between and among the various branches of state 
and federal government as its most important role; the very foundation of 
American liberty.33  The constitutional distribution of decision-making 
power in 1789 was—and remains today—profoundly important because 
various results may be proper at different times and in different 
circumstances.34 
The Constitution was not drafted to resolve every difficult, troublesome 
and/or controversial issue of public policy.35  In the areas where it speaks 
 
31. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 509 (Black & Stewart, JJ., dissenting). 
32. See, e.g., Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 178.  As Justice Black explained in his Griswold 
dissent: 
I realize that many good and able men have eloquently spoken and written, sometimes 
in rhapsodical strains, about the duty of this Court to keep the Constitution in tune 
with the times.  The idea is that the Constitution must be changed from time to time 
and that this Court is charged with a duty to make those changes.  For myself, I must 
with all deference reject that philosophy.  The Constitution makers knew the need for 
change and provided for it.  Amendments suggested by the people’s elected 
representatives can be submitted to the people or their selected agents for ratification.  
That method of change was good for our Fathers, and being somewhat old fashioned I 
must add it is good enough for me. 
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 522 (Black & Stewart, JJ., dissenting). 
33. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, 73 (Alexander Hamilton), NOS. 51, 62 (James 
Madison or Alexander Hamilton), available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/federal/ 
fed.htm (discussing the importance of separation of powers as the primary security for the 
freedom and liberty of the American people). 
34. See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 504 n.17 (1999) (“The Framers split the atom of 
sovereignty.  It was the genius of their idea that our citizens would have two political capacities, 
one state and one federal, each protected from incursion by the other.” (citing U.S. Term Limits, 
Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
35. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 624-25 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).  Justice 
Harlan criticizes what he calls a “current mistaken view of the Constitution and the constitutional 
function of this Court”: 
This view, in a nutshell, is that every major social ill in this country can find its cure in 
some constitutional “principle,” and that this Court should “take the lead” in 
promoting reform when other branches of government fail to act.  The Constitution is 
not a panacea for every blot upon the public welfare, nor should this Court, ordained 
as a judicial body, be thought of as a general haven for reform movements.  The 
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rather clearly, the Constitution leaves final decision making authority with 
the judiciary.36  If state or federal governments exercise power in a manner 
that encroaches upon core constitutional values (as set out in constitutional 
text construed in light of the actual practices, experience and traditions of 
the American people),37 the judiciary must act to protect those values.38  But 
the drafters of the American Constitution believed this judicial role would 
be exceptional and rarely invoked.39  As the Federalist Papers proclaim, the 
judiciary is the “least dangerous” branch because judges do not create 
policy but merely exercise “judgment.”40  The really difficult questions, the 
Founders thought, were left to the people. 
The Supreme Court has departed from the decision making structure 
established by the Founders on more than one occasion.41  Prior to Griswold 
 
Constitution is an instrument of government, fundamental to which is the premise that 
in a diffusion of governmental authority lies the greatest promise that this Nation will 
realize liberty for all its citizens.  This Court, limited in function in accordance with 
that premise, does not serve its high purpose when it exceeds its authority, even to 
satisfy justified impatience with the slow workings of the political process.  For when, 
in the name of constitutional interpretation, the Court adds something to the 
Constitution that was deliberately excluded from it, the Court in reality substitutes its 
view of what should be so for the amending process. 
Id. 
36. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 7 (emphasizing that if the legislature were to pass a 
law that were contrary to one of the clauses of the constitution then it would remain to the courts 
of justice “whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the 
[C]onstitution void.  Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would 
amount to nothing”). 
37. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710 (1997) (“[It] begin[s], as we do 
in all due process cases, by examining our Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices.”). 
38. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 7. 
39. Id. (asserting that the judicial invalidation of a legislative act would be quite rare since “it 
would require an uncommon portion of fortitude in the judges to do their duty as faithful 
guardians of the Constitution” to strike down “legislative invasions” of the Constitution 
“instigated by the major voice of the community”). 
40. As THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 explains: 
Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power must perceive, that 
in a government in which they are separated from each other, the judiciary, from the 
nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the 
constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them.  The 
executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword of the community.  The 
legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties 
and rights of every citizen are to be regulated.  The judiciary on the contrary has no 
influence over either the sword or the purse, no direction either of the strength or of 
the wealth of the society, and can take no active resolution whatever.  It may truly be 
said to have neither Force nor Will, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend 
upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
41. All of the Court’s departures from constitutional text can be explained as judicial 
attempts to keep the Constitution in tune with the times.  History, however, demonstrates that 
keeping the Constitution in tune with the times is a questionable enterprise at best.  See, e.g., Dred 
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
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 In Dred Scott v. Sandford, the Court invalidated the Missouri Compromise.  Dred Scott, 60 
U.S. at 432.  Under the terms of that compromise, which was merely one part of an on-going 
attempt to negotiate a political resolution of the slavery question—Congress prohibited slavery in 
Missouri.  Id. at 455 (Wayne, J., concurring).  Dred Scott, the son of slaves forcibly brought to 
America from Africa, claimed that he, his wife and his children had been freed when their master 
brought them to Missouri.  Id. at 398 (majority opinion).  The majority opinion, written by Chief 
Justice Taney, concluded that this congressional action violated the slave owner’s “due process” 
rights under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, 
which provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, and property, without 
due process of law.  And an act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United 
States of his liberty or property, merely because he came himself or brought his 
property into a particular Territory of the United States, and who had committed no 
offence against the laws, could hardly be dignified with the name of due process of 
law. 
Id. at 450. 
 According to the majority opinion, “due process” protected Mr. Sandford’s “property”—his 
ownership of Mr. and Mrs. Scott and their children—despite the express language of Article IV, 
Section 3 of the Constitution, which authorized Congress to “make all needful rules and 
regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States.”  Id. at 432 
(citing U.S. CONST. art IV, § 3).  Prior to Dred Scott, congressional power to enact the sort of 
legislation struck down by Chief Justice Taney’s opinion had never been doubted.  Article IV, 
Section 3 of the Constitution previously had been interpreted by Chief Justice John Marshall as 
conferring broad power on Congress to make all regulations deemed appropriate for the 
governance of territories and new states.  See, e.g., Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. 541, 542 
(1828) (indicating that the Territory of Florida was “governed by virtue of that clause in the 
Constitution, which empowers Congress to make all needful rules and regulations, respecting the 
territory, or other property belonging to the United States”) (quoting U.S. CONST. art IV, § 3). 
 Dred Scott is the Supreme Court’s first reported opinion invoking a free-wheeling 
“substantive due process” liberty analysis; an approach characteristic of Griswold, Roe and 
subsequent cases.  See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833, 998 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Dred Scott . . . rested upon the concept of ‘substantive 
due process’ that the Court praises and employs today.”).  Dred Scott’s departure from 
constitutional text made the Nation’s bloodiest conflict—the Civil War—inevitable by making 
political resolution of the slavery question impossible. 
 Following the Civil War, the Nation adopted the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth 
Amendments to reverse the holding in Dred Scott.  For a relatively brief period following their 
adoption, the Supreme Court applied the express language of these important amendments to 
invalidate state efforts to discriminate against the Nation’s former slaves.  In Strauder v. West 
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 312 (1879), for example, the Court invalidated a state law excluding 
former slaves from serving on juries.  The Court noted that the Fourteenth Amendment was 
crafted precisely to ordain that: 
[T]he law in the States shall be the same for the black as for the white; that all persons, 
whether colored or white, shall stand equal before the laws of the States, and, in regard 
to the colored race, for whose protection the amendment was primarily designed, that 
no discrimination shall be made against them by law because of their color[.] 
Id. at 307.  In Railroad Co. v. Brown, 84 U.S. (1 Wall.) 445 (1873), the Court invalidated an 
attempt by a railroad to comply with the commands of federal legislation and the Fourteenth 
Amendment by providing separate but equal “accommodations for” Blacks.  Brown, 84 U.S. (1 
Wall.) at 452.  The Court noted that Congress had required “equal treatment” in the operation of 
the railroad and rejected the company’s “ingenious attempt to evade a compliance with the 
obvious meaning of the requirement.”  Id.  See also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 
(1886) (invalidating a municipal regulatory regime that routinely denied business licenses to 
Chinese residents; “the conclusion cannot be resisted that no reason for [the license denial] exists 
except hostility to the race and nationality to which the petitioners belong, and which, in the eye of 
the law, is not justified”). 
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and Lawrence, the most recent period of judicial excess was ended, at least 
in part, by President Roosevelt’s famous threat to “pack the Court” in 
1937.42  From the late 1890s to the mid-1930s, the Justices of the Supreme 
Court invalidated various state and federal legislative judgments on the 
ground that the legislative judgments unduly interfered with the “liberty” of 
American citizens.43  Back then the unwritten freedom that the Court en-
forced was not privacy, but economic liberty. 
In Lochner v. New York, 44 for example, the Court struck down a law 
establishing a ten-hour workday for bakery employees who labored near hot 
and dangerous wood and gas-fired ovens.45  Why was this seemingly 
 
 Less than twenty years after Strauder, however, with its decision in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 
U.S. 537 (1896), the Supreme Court turned its back on a strict textual application of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, concluding that a railroad’s provision of “separate but equal” railway 
cars for white and black passengers complied with all relevant constitutional commands.  The 
opinion’s refusal to follow the path marked by cases such as Strauder, Railroad Company, and 
Yick Wo was rather obviously influenced by the Court’s perception of current political trends.  The 
majority opinion attempted to justify its departure from constitutional text by citing as authorita-
tive precedent, not its own prior opinions interpreting the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth 
Amendments, but opinions from state courts that may well have been motivated to uphold and 
sanction various discriminatory actions.  See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550 (distinguishing Yick Wo by, 
among other things, citing five state cases discussing various discriminatory state programs).  The 
Court feebly attempted to justify its retreat from express constitutional language and its 
realignment with current political views by asserting that: 
[T]he underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument . . . [is] the assumption that the 
enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of 
inferiority.  If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely 
because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it. 
Id. at 551.  Justice Harlan, in dissent, noted that the express terms of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, 
and Fifteenth Amendments prohibited the officially supported discrimination involved in Plessy.  
Id. at 555 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  He concluded that, “[i]n my opinion, the judgment this day 
rendered will, in time, prove to be quite as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal in the 
Dred Scott Case.”  Id. at 559. 
 Justice Harlan was right.  It took the Court over fifty years to begin correcting the 
constitutional error it condoned in Plessy.  See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
Without question, the process of eliminating the lingering effects of slavery would have been 
difficult even if the Court had followed the path set in Strauder, Railroad Company and Yick Wo.  
The Court’s fifty year departure from the text of the post-Civil War Amendments, however, has 
made a difficult process seem nearly impossible.  More than fifty years since Brown, the norms 
enshrined in the language of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments remain 
aspirations rather than realities.  See generally Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (providing opinions struggling with the difficult issues posed by 
affirmative action programs, “reverse” discrimination, and the general social unrest caused by 
long-delayed achievement of racial equality). 
42. Mary Murphy Schroeder, The Ninth Circuit and Judicial Independence: It Can’t Be 
Politics as Usual, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 4-5 (2005) (giving a short story of the court packing plan 
and how Roosevelt did not want to be held to the “horse and buggy days” of the Court’s 
interpretation of the Commerce Clause). 
43. See generally Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 561-62 (1923); St. Louis Cotton 
Compress Co. v. Arkansas, 260 U.S. 346, 347-48 (1922); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57-
58 (1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 591-93 (1897). 
44. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
45. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64-65. 
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sensible regulation unconstitutional?  Because, by setting a limit on the 
number of hours an employee could work, New York had unduly interfered 
with the right of free men to negotiate their own terms of employment.46  In 
the 1920s, the shadows of the Constitution protected a rather unusual con-
stitutional right indeed: the “right” of New York bakers to work themselves 
to death.47 
By 1936, cases like Lochner threatened to invalidate the Roosevelt 
Administration’s efforts to ease the economic suffering caused by the Great 
Depression.48  Various provisions of the New Deal interfered with eco-
nomic rights highly valued by the Justices. 49  After the Supreme Court 
invalidated parts of the National Industrial Recovery Act50 and the Agricul-
tural Adjustment Act51 in 1935 and 1936 respectively, President Roosevelt 
went on the offensive.  Following his election to a second term, in one of 
his famous “fireside chats,” he threatened in 1937 to appoint a new 
Supreme Court Justice for each one of the “nine old men” on the Supreme 
Court over the age of seventy.52  These Justices, the President declared, 
were “out of touch” with the needs of ordinary Americans, the economic 
realities of the day, and even the intentions of the Founders.53  Such a 
strong message from a popular president prompted Congress to hold 
hearings on the proposal, but before any changes were made, the Supreme 
Court abandoned its enforcement of non-enumerated constitutional liberties 
and the president abandoned his plan to pack the Court. 
The Supreme Court made an abrupt about-face between December 
1936 and the end of the first quarter of 1937.  On the heels of President 
Roosevelt’s challenge, the Court began to implicitly condemn its prior 
decisions as unwarranted judicial departures from the text of the 
 
46. Id. at 57. 
47. Lochner is generally considered the great “progenitor” of the modern substantive due 
process cases discussed below.  See David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: 
Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 13 (2003). 
48. See, e.g., William E. Leuchtenburg, When the People Spoke, What Did They Say?: The 
Election of 1936 and the Ackerman Thesis, 108 YALE L.J. 2077, 2079-80, 2082-87 (1999) (citing 
various cases and some of Roosevelt’s reactions to them leading up to the introduction of his 
court-packing plan). 
49. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 316-17 (1936) (striking down the 
“little NRA”); Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513, 532 
(1936) (striking down the Municipal Bankruptcy Act); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 
(1936) (striking down the Agricultural Adjustment Act); Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 
295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935) (striking down the National Industrial Recovery Act). 
50. Schecter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 551; Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 433 
(1935). 
51. Butler, 297 U.S. at 68. 
52. Fireside Chats of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Fireside Chat on the Reorganization of the 
Judiciary, Mar. 9, 1937, available at http://www.fdrlibrary.marist .edu/030937.html. 
53. Id. 
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Constitution.54  Rather than invalidating legislation because it restricted the 
unenumerated economic liberties of American citizens, the Court opined 
regarding the obligation, duty and privilege of free men and women to 
govern themselves by debating and deciding difficult questions of social 
and economic policy. 55  The Court seemingly recalled, and conducted its 
business pursuant to, Chief Justice John Marshall’s famous dictum in 
Marbury v. Madison56 that “the framers of the [C]onstitution contemplated 
that instrument as a rule for the government of courts, as well as of the 
legislature.”57 
Throughout the early 1960s, the Court regularly opined regarding the 
dangers of enforcing judicially preferred policies, in disregard of the text, 
structure and history of the American Constitution.58  Unfortunately, 
Griswold and subsequent privacy cases paid little heed.  The contraception 
law in Griswold was, as Justice Stewart observed, “uncommonly silly” and 
outdated.59  But however proper the result in Griswold seemed and still 
seems today, the analysis launched by the case encouraged social activists, 
lawyers, law professors, and judges to increasingly ignore the fact that 
Article III does not establish the federal courts as the perpetual censor of 
unreasonable legislation or as the ultimate arbiter of all divisive moral 
controversies. 
Most legislative and executive decisions are not controlled (and cannot 
be controlled) by the presciently precise language of the Constitution.60  If 
the “correct” answers to pressing questions are fairly debatable, those 
 
54. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 397 (1937) (overruling Adkins 
v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) by upholding minimum wage legislation); Nat’l Labor 
Relations Bd. (NLRB) v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 49 (1937) (upholding the 
constitutionality of the Wagner Act). 
55. See Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 30 (discussing the presumption of constitutionality 
afforded legislative enactments). 
56. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
57. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 179-80 (emphasis added). 
58. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729-30 (1963) (stating that “intrusion by the 
judiciary into the realm of legislative value judgments” characterized a number of past decisions, 
but that “[t]he doctrine . . . that due process authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional when 
they believe the legislature has acted unwisely—has long since been discarded”). 
59. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 527 (Stewart & Black, JJ., dissenting). 
60. Id. at 530-31. 
[I]t is not the function of this Court to decide cases on the basis of community 
standards.  We are here to decide cases “agreeably to the Constitution and laws of the 
United States.”  It is the essence of judicial duty to subordinate our own personal 
views, our own ideas of what legislation is wise and what is not.  If, as I should surely 
hope, the law before us does not reflect the standards of the people of Connecticut, the 
people of Connecticut can freely exercise their true Ninth and Tenth Amendment 
rights to persuade their elected representatives to repeal it.  That is the constitutional 
way to take this law off the books. 
Id. 
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questions must be—indeed, should only be—resolved by legislative action.  
The “correct” answers to such questions as the appropriate level of welfare 
assistance,61 the purity of the nation’s air,62 and the sexual conduct of its 
citizens63 are fairly debatable and, therefore, should be left for resolution by 
state and national legislatures.64 
This is particularly true when government action involves moral 
questions.  Although it seems almost prehistoric to note that government 
action implicates moral issues, questions of morality abound in government 
decision-making.65  The all-too-common contention that “government has 
no business regulating morality” makes a good sound bite, but not much 
sense.  Governmental decisions always involve striking a balance between 
competing moral values.  To whom should society pay welfare benefits?  
How much?  When?  These and thousands of other questions addressed 
daily by government necessarily will be resolved in favor of one moral 
view or another.  The “right to privacy,” enunciated in Griswold and 
expanded in cases thereafter,66 has rendered the American legal system 
increasingly oblivious to the reality that debatable moral and ethical 
questions are poor candidates for judicial resolution. 
Following Griswold, the privacy right supposedly founded on the 
“sacred” institution of “marriage” was extended to unmarried couples,67 a 
substantive result that (again) sparked little disagreement.68  But the Court’s 
 
61. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) (refusing to review state-
provided benefits under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses). 
62. See, e.g., Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 198 (1976) (construing respective rights and 
duties of state and federal governments in implementing the Clean Air Act). 
63. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (noting laws should not be 
invalidated based on the reasoning that sodomy is immoral), rev’d, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558 (2003). 
64. See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL 
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW passim (New York, MacMillan 1990). 
65. See Dallin H. Oaks, Former Chicago Law Professor, Justice on the Utah Supreme Court, 
and Executive Director of the American Bar Foundation, Religious Values and Public Policy, 
Address to the Brigham Young University Management Society (Feb. 29, 1992), in ENSIGN, Oct. 
1992, at 60 (stating that there is scarcely a piece of legislation that is not founded on some con-
ception of morality; the issue is merely “whose morality and what legislation”); see also Bowers, 
478 U.S. at 196 (“The law . . . is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws repre-
senting essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts 
will be very busy indeed.”). 
66. For a good discussion of the development of the privacy right as it relates to sexual 
issues, see Donald H. J. Hermann, Pulling the Fig Leaf off the Right to Privacy: Sex and the 
Constitution, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 909, passism (2005). 
67. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454-55 (1972). 
68. See John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE 
L.J. 920, 943 (1973) (explaining that the results of Griswold and subsequent cases were so popular 
that criticisms were like crying “wolf,” such that when the Court abandoned all pretense of 
judicial restraint with Roe v. Wade, few listened to the serious separation of powers issues raised 
by the case). 
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expansion of privacy to include abortion in Roe v. Wade69 revealed how 
easy it is for judges to stumble when walking through constitutional shad-
ows.70  Roe starkly revealed the kinds of questions the Court (rather than the 
people) would decide under the penumbral “right to privacy.” 
The Roe Court took pains to explain that abortion was particularly well 
suited for judicial resolution precisely because it involved, among other 
things,71 “the difficult question of when life begins”; a question upon which 
the Court need not “speculate as to the answer.”72  But, despite this dis-
claimer, the Court announced that a woman could terminate the life of an 
unborn child for any (or no) reason at any time prior to the point when the 
child could live outside the womb.73  By providing a speculative response 
(“life,” or at least legally cognizable “life,” begins at “viability”)74 to a 
question the Court purportedly did not need to “answer,”75 the unusual 
contours of the a-constitutional right of privacy at last drew significant 
attention.76  Philosophers, ethicists and many Americans recognized that the 
utilitarian reasoning of Roe raised a host of disconcerting questions.77  For 
 
69. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
70. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (explaining that terminating a pregnancy is a right encompassed 
under personal liberty and the right to privacy). 
71. Id. at 116-17. The Court stated: 
We forthwith acknowledge our awareness of the sensitive and emotional nature of the 
abortion controversy, of the vigorous opposing views, even among physicians, and of 
the deep and seemingly absolute convictions that the subject inspires.  One’s philoso-
phy, one’s experiences, one’s exposure to the raw edges of human existence, one’s 
religious training, one’s attitudes toward life and family and their values, and the 
moral standards one establishes and seeks to observe, are all likely to influence and to 
color one’s thinking and conclusions about abortion. 
Id. 
72. Id. at 159. 
We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins.  When those trained in 
the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at 
any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of man’s knowledge, is 
not in a position to speculate as to the answer. 
Id. 
73. Id. at 163. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 159. 
76. See Hart Ely, supra note 68, at 936-38 (discussing Roe’s dramatic departure from 
established standards of judicial review).  The debate surrounding Roe is too extensive to 
chronicle here, but for a good general discussion of the history and legal theory, see N. E. H. 
HULL & PETER CHARLES HOFFER, ROE V. WADE: THE ABORTION RIGHTS CONTROVERSY IN 
AMERICAN HISTORY (2001).  For a less scholarly, but more accessible summary, see also 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roe_v._Wade#Controversy_over_Roe. 
77. The willingness of the Court in Roe to balance the value of unborn human life against a 
woman’s claim to privacy, led inevitably to claims that the Constitution also protects a right to 
assisted suicide, or “active” euthanasia, a position, so far, rejected by the Court.  See Washington 
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997) (rejecting assertion that the right to assisted suicide is 
protected by the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses).  But Roe raises other ethical issues as 
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the first time since Griswold, many Americans paused.  It seemed the Court 
might, too. 
Roe forced America, and the Court, to confront whether the Constitu-
tion in fact mandates judicial resolution of social controversies precisely 
because they are moral, divisive, and difficult.  The legal academy that had 
nurtured privacy analysis78 and warmly welcomed Griswold79 now rushed 
to rewrite and re-explain the Supreme Court’s astonishing decision.  
Thousands of pages in the law reviews were dedicated to sophisticated (and 
often incomprehensible and contradictory) justifications for Roe’s elimina-
tion of democratic debate and decision making at the very moment they 
were needed most.80  These obviously post hoc apologetics embarrassed the 
Court and for many years the Court was hesitant to lengthen the shadows of 
Griswold. 
Indeed, in the 1986 opinion of Bowers v. Hardwick,81 the Court 
avoided the right to privacy altogether and looked (at long last) to the lan-
guage of the Constitution and the teachings of long-standing American 
traditions and history.82  Bowers concluded that states could decide whether 
or not to regulate homosexual conduct, even if the chosen course seemed 
prudish, silly, or outdated, because there is nothing in the language of the 
Constitution that directly addresses the question.83  The right to privacy did 
not dictate a contrary result, the Court noted, because human sexuality 
involves debatable questions of morality that have been regulated for 
centuries—and might warrant regulation today.84  The Bowers Court also 
noted that homosexual behavior, unlike that involved in Griswold and Roe, 
bears no resemblance to family relationships, marriage, or procreation. 85 
 
well.  For a recent example, see Larry I. Palmer, Genetic Health and Eugenics Precedents: A 
Voice of Caution, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 237, 255 (2002) (“[W]ithout a woman’s legal right to 
have an abortion . . . genetic liability claims would not be theoretically possible.” (citing Hummel 
v. Reiss, 608 A.2d 1341, 1343 (N.J. 1992))). 
78. The legal academia proposed the right to privacy nearly eight decades prior to Griswold.  
See generally Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 
193 (1890).  For a good discussion on the development of the privacy doctrine generally, see Amy 
Peikoff, No Corn on This Cobb: Why Reductionists Should be all Ears for Pavesich, 42 BRANDEIS 
L.J. 751 (2004). 
79. See Rubenfield, supra note 30, at 740-52; ACKERMAN, supra note 30, at 140-59. 
80. See Seth F. Kreimer, Does Pro-Choice Mean Pro-Kevorkian? An Essay on Roe, Casey, 
and the Right to Die, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 803, 808 (1995) (criticizing Roe and citing to numerous 
articles attempting to provide alternative rationales for the decision); see also sources cited supra 
notes 76, 77. 
81. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
82. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192-95. 
83. Id. at 192-96. 
84. Id. at 195-96. 
85. Id. at 190-91. 
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Even Roe underwent a transformation during this momentary waning 
of privacy analysis.  In the 1992 decision of Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,86 the Supreme Court pointedly did not 
reaffirm the reasoning of Roe.87  As the dissenting Justices noted, the con-
trolling opinion for the Court could not “bring itself to say that Roe was 
correct as an original matter.”88  Caught in a difficult gap between Roe’s 
faulty logic and its refusal to reject Roe’s result, the Court resorted to stare 
decisis—a doctrine which provides that a legal question, once decided, 
remains decided.  Roe may have gotten it wrong, the Court announced, but 
right or wrong the decision would stand.89  It looked like the right to 
privacy had itself become penumbral. 
At least in constitutional law if not in real life, never underestimate the 
compelling substance of partial and incomplete shadows.  The decision in 
Lawrence demonstrates that the Court has recovered from the bout of 
judicial modesty it suffered between Bowers and Casey.  The penumbra of 
privacy is back. 
III. OF EXISTENCE, MEANING, THE UNIVERSE AND MYSTERY 
Lawrence announced that Roe did not get it wrong after all.  Rather, it 
is Bowers (and the hesitant approach of Casey) that are constitutionally 
suspect.  Bowers, in fact, is reversed.90  Lawrence also declares that the 
reasoning of Bowers—that family, marriage and procreation are sturdy 
enough social interests to overcome the judicially created right to privacy—
is fatally flawed.  And, astonishingly enough, Griswold is wrong, too.  
Forget all that talk in 1965 about the “sacred” nature of the “marital union”; 
privacy (following the Court’s further consideration) has nothing at all to 
do with marriage, procreation, or the bearing and rearing of children.91  
Instead, privacy vests sexual partners with a constitutional entitlement to 
determine their “own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and 
of the mystery of human life.”92  Under this “concept of existence,” “mean-
ing” and “mystery” clause, government may not “demean” consenting adult 
sexual behavior.93 
 
86. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
87. Casey, 505 U.S. at 870-71. 
88. Id. at 953 (Rehnquist, C.J., White, Scalia, & Thomas, JJ., dissenting). 
89. Id. at 871 (plurality opinion). 
90. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
91. See id. at 574, 578-79. 
92. Id. at 574 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 851). 
93. Id. at 574, 578. 
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Accordingly, society may have no business making any distinction 
between a marital union of a man and a woman and a sexual partnership 
between two men, two women or (why not?) three men and four women.94  
If marriage is “sacred” (as Griswold declared),95 can society “demean” 
other sexual relationships under Lawrence by suggesting they are not?  
Furthermore, can a state even require sexual fidelity between spouses?  If it 
does, does that not “demean” individuals whose “meaning of the universe” 
includes “open marriage”?  Probably.  Thus, marriage may no longer mean 
a man and a woman, two people, sexual exclusivity, or exclude partnerships 
between close relatives.96 
Thus, through the questionable logic of legal reasoning purposely freed 
from the tethers of the actual language of the United States Constitution and 
American tradition, a purported right which sprang from the centuries old 
social institution called marriage may soon become that institution’s very 
undoing.97  No wonder Justice Scalia notes that Lawrence “leaves on pretty 
shaky grounds state laws limiting marriage to opposite sex couples.”98 
 
94. Robert P. George, What’s Sex Got to Do With It? Marriage, Morality, and Rationality, 
49 AM. J. JURIS. 63, 81 n.63 (2004). 
95. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). 
96. Because human reproduction is impossible between partners in same-sex relationships, 
consanguinity rules (which generally prohibit marriage between close relatives to guard against, 
among other things, genetic concerns related to reproduction) would seemingly pose no obstacle 
to marriages between two sisters, two brothers, a mother and her daughter, or a father and his son. 
97. The concluding paragraph of Griswold adulates marriage: 
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate 
to the degree of being sacred.  It is an association that promotes a way of life, not 
causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or 
social projects.  Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our 
prior decisions. 
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486. 
98. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 601 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  In addition to Lawrence, decisions 
from various state courts demonstrate just how “shaky” judicial action has rendered established 
laws related to marriage.  Judicial decisions in favor of legalizing same-sex marriage or marriage-
equivalent unions have come from Hawaii, Alaska, Vermont, Massachusetts and New Jersey. 
Alaska: Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562, 1998 WL 88743, at *6 (Alaska. 
Super. Ct., Feb. 27, 1998); Hawaii: Baehr v. Miicke, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *22 
(Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993); Massachusetts: 
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 943, 959 (Mass. 2003); New Jersey: Lewis 
v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 224 (N.J. 2006); Vermont: Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 889 (Vt. 1999); 
In re Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 569-71 (Mass. 2004).  Courts in New 
York and California have in the past rejected judicially mandated same-sex marriage. California: 
In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675, 726 (Cal. App. 2006) (request for review granted); 
New York: Hernandez v. Robles, 7 N.Y.3d 338, 379 (N.Y. 2006).  See also Andersen v. King 
County, 138 P.3d 963, 998 (Wash. 2006) (Johnson, J., concurring) (explaining that executing 
novel changes to public policy through judicial decree erodes constitutional protections and limits 
constitutional balance).  In 2004, a trial court in Oregon ordered the state to recognize same-sex 
marriages, but that decision was reversed by the Oregon Supreme Court after voters in Oregon 
adopted a constitutional amendment, infra note 101, defining marriage as the union of a man and a 
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Following Lawrence, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court relied 
upon the reasoning of the Supreme Court’s opinion to hold that the 
Massachusetts Constitution, although nowhere discussing or addressing the 
matter in its actual text, demands official recognition of same-sex 
marriage.99  Within eighteen months of the decisions in Lawrence and 
Massachusetts, voters in eleven states amended their state constitutions to 
define marriage as the union of a man and a woman.100  This unusual action 
by states ranging in political views from Mississippi to Utah to Oregon does 
more than prevent state courts from invoking privacy (or other judicial 
innovations) to redefine marriage; it also demonstrates the growing unease 
of Americans with expanding state and federal judicial power. 
Americans are becoming aware that, over the past forty years, the 
judiciary’s increasing disregard of constitutional strictures has deprived 
them of the ability to answer many of the political questions that affect 
them most.  Marriage is just one of the more recent questions the judges are 
about to take from the hands of American voters.  As a result, more than 
marriage is on shaky ground.  So is America’s “greatest improvement on 
political institutions”: the idea of “a written Constitution.”101 
IV. WITHER THE CONSTITUTION TOMORROW? 
The reasoning in Lawrence erodes democratic control of debatable—
and unquestionably difficult—issues of moral concern.  By substituting a 
potentially far-reaching (and as yet undefined) “concept of existence, of 
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life” test102 for the 
actual text of the Constitution, Lawrence seriously erodes the ability of 
American citizens to engage in open and honest political discussions 
regarding the outcome of an unknown range of fairly debatable moral con-
troversies.  Such questions—ranging from cloning and biomedical research 
 
woman.  Li v. State, No. 0403-03057, 2004 WL 1258167, at *10 (Or. Cir. Apr. 20, 2004), rev’d, 
110 P.3d 91, 96 (Or. 2005). 
99. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 973-74. 
100. Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, and Utah have passed state constitutional amendments in 2004 defining 
marriage as between a man and a woman.  Thomas Roberts & Sean Gibbons, Same-Sex Marriage 
Bans Winning on State Ballots, CNN.com, Nov. 3, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/ 
ALLPOLITICS/11/02/ballot.samesex.marriage/.  In all, twenty-seven states have now amended 
their constitutions “in order to prevent civil unions or same-sex marriages from being legalized.”  
List of Defense of Marriage Amendments to U.S. State Constitutions by Type, http://en.wikipedia. 
org/wiki/List_of_defense_of_marriage_amendments_to_U.S._state_constitutions_by_type (last 
visited Feb. 26, 2008). 
101. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803). 
102. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574. 
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to euthanasia103 and children’s rights104—involve some of the most pressing 
issues of modern life. 
After Lawrence, which democratic judgments in these areas will 
survive the new (and apparently individualistic and idiosyncratic) “concept 
of existence” and “mystery of human life” test?  Who can tell?  Will the 
long-standing definition of marriage as the union of a man and a woman 
withstand judicial analysis?  No one knows.105 
Throughout America, ordinary citizens, lawyers, law professors, legis-
lators and judges obviously disagree regarding the meaning of marriage.  
The existence of this deep disagreement, however, demands that the People, 
rather than the judges, determine the meaning, content and social role of 
Griswold’s “sacred” relationship.106  Marriage is an essential and long-
standing social institution with profound importance for the social health of 
American society.107  And, while it is unclear what impact judicial redefini-
tion of marriage might have on American society, there is surprisingly a 
general agreement that further debilitation of marriage in America would be 
dangerous indeed.108  The meaning and social role of marriage is too 
important—and the current health of the institution too fragile109—for its 
meaning and future vitality to be determined by the oligarchic votes of as 
 
103. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997) (rejecting the claim that 
the Due Process Clause establishes a constitutional right to active euthanasia; however, the 
Court’s analysis rests upon a textual and historical examination of the meaning of the clause—the 
interpretative approach rejected in Lawrence). 
104. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574-78 (2005) (ascertaining the content of 
the Eighth Amendment by relying, in part, upon the practice of foreign nations and the terms of an 
international treaty never ratified by the Senate).  Compare id. at 607-08 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., 
dissenting) (asserting that the Court’s holding rests not upon the language of the Eighth 
Amendment or the history of its implementation by the American states, but upon the majority’s 
notions regarding “evolving standards of decency” derived in significant part from “the views of 
foreign courts and legislatures”). 
105. See, e.g., authority cited supra notes 98 & 101. 
106. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). 
107. INSTITUTE FOR AMERICAN VALUES, WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS: TWENTY-SIX 
CONCLUSIONS FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 5-7, 9-11 (2d ed. 2005). 
108. Id. at 6-7.  Since the publication of the first edition of the study, a careful consideration 
of all available social scientific studies support five new findings; among these are findings that: 
[1. A]n emerging line of research indicates that marriage benefits poor Americans, and 
Americans from disadvantaged backgrounds, even though these Americans are now 
less likely to get and stay married; 
[2. M]arriage seems to be particularly important in civilizing men, turning their 
attention away from dangerous, antisocial, or self-centered activities and towards the 
needs of a family; and 
[3. B]eyond its well-known contributions to adult health, marriage influences the 
biological functioning of adults and children in ways that can have important social 
consequences. 
109. See id. (providing all twenty-six findings). 
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few as five Members of the Supreme Court.  As Abraham Lincoln warned 
in his First Inaugural Address:  
[I]f the policy of the government upon vital questions affecting the 
whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the 
Supreme Court, the instant they are made in ordinary 
litigation . . . , the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, 
having to that extent practically resigned their Government into the 
hands of that eminent tribunal.110 
At the end of the day, Lawrence raises a fundamental question 
regarding the constitutional process for determining the outcome of 
important social and moral controversies in America.  The pressing issue is 
whether the People or the Court should decide the outcome of debatable, 
divisive, difficult, even transcendent, questions of social morality.  The 
Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence portends that the meaning of 
marriage may be removed from the realm of democratic debate, adjustment, 
compromise and resolution.  This is a serious, and profoundly suspect, 
matter of structural constitutional law. 
In 2008, the United States faces the question that President Roosevelt 
confronted in 1936 and 1937: When the precise words of the Constitution, 
considered in light of the country’s constitutional traditions, do not provide 
an indisputable answer for the resolution of a contentious moral, ethical and 
political question, who charts the Republic’s course—the People or the 
Court?  This is the question raised by Lawrence. 
All Americans should care how it is answered. 
 
 
110. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), available at http://www. 
bartleby.com/124/pres31.html; cf. Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), 
available at http://www.law.ou.edu/hist/getty.html (noting that the Civil War involved whether 
“government of the people, by the people, [and] for the people” will “perish”). 
